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ABSTRACT 
Previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a 
"portfolio problem, " deriving the optimal consumption of the "risky 
asset" (unreported income) under the assumption of a fixed probability 
of detection, The purpose of this paper is to examine some of these 
issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions. 
In particular, we compare alternative audit policies to the standard 
random audit policy. We focus on an "audit cutoff" policy, in which 
an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is "too low," 
and is not audited if reported income is "sufficiently high." 
This paper establishes two major results. First, random audit 
rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules. It can be shown, 
given lump-sum taxes and fines, that these audit cutoff rules are the 
least-cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income. 
Second, the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules 
holds for "lump-sum" as well as proportional taxation - in fact, the 
equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent. 
TIIE ECONOMICS OF INCOME TAXATION: 
COMPLIANCE IN A PRINCIPAL-AGFNT FRAJ.filWORK 
Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde• 
1. IN'ffiODUCTION 
One of the ubiquitous features of modern systems of income 
taxation is their essentially voluntary nature. While an individual 
taxpayer always faces some chance of being audited by the Internal 
Revenue Service, to take the U.S. as an example, most individuals pay 
a sum which depends upon the income they choose to report, which is 
not necessarily the same as their actual income, The purpose of this 
paper is to analyze income tax compliance (or evasion) starting from a 
set of assumptions which is somewhat different from the usual ones. 
There are three topic areas in the economics literature to 
which this work is related. The first is optimal taxation, There is 
a large literature on this subject; a recent survey can be found in 
Sandmo (197 6). A second related topic area is the work on "crime and 
punishment" (e.g., Becker (1968), Stigler (1970) and Becker and 
Stigler (1974)), and the third is the literature on tax evasion, 
While the literature on tax evasion is closely related to that on 
crime and punishment, the two are distinguished partly by the absence 
of a tax rate in the work on crime and punishment, Research in these 
last two areas typically treats noncompliance as a decision under 
uncertainty where the individual faces a given probability of 
detection and conviction, and given tax and penalty functions (e.g., 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Srinivasan (1973), and Yitzhaki (1974)). 
Having solved the problem of optimal under-reporting (in this 
framework), some authors have investigated endogenous labor supply 
decisions (e.g., Andersen (1977), Baldry (1979) and Pencavel (1979)), 
and the extent to which individuals shift their labor supply from 
primary markets in which wage income is reported, to secondary or 
"underground" markets in which wage income goes unreported (e.g., 
Isachsen and Strom (1980), Cowell (1981) and Sandmo (1981)), Others 
have investigated random audits (or random taxes), noting that they 
may have beneficial incentive effects when labor supply decisions are 
endogenous and individuals are risk averse (e.g., Stiglitz (197 6) and 
Weiss (197 6)), Finally, there has been some treatment of the 
determination of the optimal probability of detection and/or the 
penalty for evasion, usually under the assumption that the objective 
of the government is the maximization of some measure of social 
welfare (e.g., Kolm (1973), Singh (1973), Fishburn (1979), Kemp and Ng 
(1979), Polinsky and Shavell (1979), Christiansen (1980), and 
Landsberger and Meilijson (1982)). 
The most complete analysis of the tax evasion problem under a 
random audit/linear tax schedule formulation can be found in Sandmo 
(1981). Jn the Sandmo model, individuals may supply labor in a 
primary market or in a secondary, or "w1derground" market, thereby 
evading taxes. The individual, in effect, faces a kind of "portfolio 
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problem" with respect to the allocation of his or her labor, The 
government, on the other hand, must choose a probability of detection, 
a fine for evasion, a proportional tax rate and possibly some lump-sum 
transfers so as to maximize a social welfare function, subject to a 
required revenue constraint, While this analysis is quite 
comprehensive, it is also quite complicated, and few unambiguous 
qualitative results emerge, 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this paper is to examine 
some of these issues in income tax compliance starting from a 
different set of assumptions than those used in the extant literature, 
In particular, we will compare alternative audit policies to the 
standard random audit policy, Accordingly, we will use a highly 
simplified framework which yields sharp results suitable for 
comparison across audit policies, 
First, we will assume that income is a random variable. 
Second, income is observed by the taxpayer costlessly, but can only be 
observed by the government if an audit cost is paid. Third, we will 
assume, at least initially, that the objective of the tax-collecting 
agency is to maximize expected revenue net of audit costs. Other 
objective functions, such as minimizing the cost of raising some given 
level of expected revenue, will be discussed later in the paper. 
The idea here is that the principal (the tax-collecting 
agency) desires to maximize net revenue but cannot observe the true 
income of the agent (the taxpayer) unless an "audit" is performed, 
The principal asks the agent to report his or her income and then 
makes a decision whether or not to audit (this decision can be 
independent of reported income or probabilistic). The agent responds 
to this system so as to maximize his or her own well-being. 
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Besides setting an audit policy, there is also a question of 
the optimal form and level of taxation. We initially assume that 
taxation is lump-sum; that is, the agent is asked to pay a tax of T 
dollars if that is feasible; otherwise the taxpayer pays all of his or 
her income. Proportional taxation is considered later in the paper. 
Finally, there is the question of what fine should be imposed 
for noncompliance, or in our model, under-reporting of income, This 
is also taken to be a c hoice variable of the principal, 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will set up 
the general model using a principal-agent framework in which the 
probability of an audit is a function of reported income. Section 3 
considers the standard case in which audits are random, occuring with 
a probability which is independent of the reported level of income. 
In this case the principal sets a lump-sum tax, a probability of audit 
and a fine for under-reporting. Taxpayers respond by reporting a 
level of income, based upon their true income, which maximizes net 
expected income (i.e. , they are assumed to be risk-neutral). In this 
situation the size of the fine is irrelevant to the optimal tax and 
audit policy and to the form of the optimal reporting strategy for the 
taxpayer (so long as the fine is positive). Moreover, either the 
optimal audit probability is one and the tax is infinite, or the 
optimal audit probability is zero and the tax is irrelevant. 
Section 4 analyzes another simple, but quite different, form 
of audit policy. The principal still sets a lump-sum tax and a fine 
for under-reporting income, but now sets a cutoff level on reported 
income such that taxpayers who report income less than the cutoff are 
audited with probability one and taxpayers who report income greater 
than or equal to the cutoff are never audited. In this situation the 
optimal cutoff will equal the optimal tax and the fine will again be 
irrelevant to the form of the actors' optimal strategies. However, 
three outcomes are now possible; the optimal tax/cutoff is zero or it 
is infinite (corresponding to the two cases possible with a random 
audit policy) or it takes on some finite value determined by the cost 
of audits and the distribution of income. Thus the audit cutoff 
policy weakly dominates the random audit policy for any given 
distribution, and strictly dominates it for some distributions, 
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The audit cutoff rule analyzed in Section 4 induces truthful 
reporting of income. In Section 5 we show that, given lump-sum taxes 
and fines, the only audit policies which induce truthful reporting are 
those which require the principal to audit with probability one any 
agent who reports income less than the tax. The audit cutoff policy 
of Section 4 is shown to be the audit policy which induces truthful 
reporting at least cost to the principal and thus is optimal within 
the class of audit policies which induce truthful reporting. 
Section 6 presents some simple examples in which the audit 
cutoff policy strictly dominates the random audit policy, and 
considers some comparative static effects. Sections 7 and 8 
reconsider the preceding analysis under proportional taxes. It is 
shown that, in this simple model, there is complete equivalence 
be tween the equilibrium results under 1 ump-sum and proportional 
taxation, Finally, Section 9 will summarize our results and outline 
several variations and extensions of the basic model. 
2. THE GIWERAL CONTROL MODEL
The formal assumptions outlined in the Introduction are as 
follows. 
Assumption 1, Income is distributed via G(I), where g(I) 
for all I e [O,w), 
G'(I) ) 0 
Assumption 2. The taxpayer observes I costlessly, the principal 
observes I only if it audits the taxpayer, at a per audit cost of 
c 2. o. 
Assumption 3, Taxation is lump-sum; that is, the principal asks the 
agent to pay min{T, I}. 
Assumption 4. If an audit is performed and the agent has under­
reported, he or she is assessed a fine of F dollars in addition to 
paying T; i. e. , he or she pays min{T + F, I}. No fine is ever paid if 
income is reported truthfully. 
Assumption 5 .  The principal sets T, F and a n  audit probability 
function p(c/), based on reported income cl, so as to maximize expected 
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revenue net of audit costs. 
Assumption 6 .  The agent sets o(I) so as to maximize expected net 
income, 
Let R(I,x) be expected net revenue to the principal from an 
individual with income I who reports x. Then 
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R(I,x) min[T,x)[l - p(x)l (1) 
+ 
{[min[I,T + Fl - clp(x)
[min[I,T) - clp(x) 
if x ( I 
if x.lI 
Equation (1) allows for the possibility of over-reporting; i.e., for 
x ) I. Although it turns out to make no difference in the optimal 
policies, we rule this out since it makes the analysis which follows 
less tedious. 
Assumption 7. Let o(I) be the reported income for an individual with 
true income I, Then o(I) i I. 
Let r(x, I) be expected net income to the agent if income I is 
observed and x is reported. Given (1), if x <I, then 
{(1 - p(x)l[I - min[x,Tll 
r(x, I) = 
[1 - p(x)l[I - min[x,T)l 
+ p(x)[I - T - Fl if I.lT + F
if I(T + F
If an individual under-reports and is not audited, then he or she pays 
only the minimum of reported income or the tax; if audited, the 
(2) 
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individual must pay the fine F as well, whenever that is possible, If 
x .l I, then A7 implies x = I, so 
{ [1 - p(I)l [I - Tl + p(I)[I - Tl
r(I,I) = 
0 
if I .l T 
(3) 
if I < T 
If the individual reports his or her income truthfully, then no fine 
is ever assessed. Define o(I) to be the optimal report for an 
individual with income I; that is, 
oO> argmax r(x,I),
Oixil 
where r(x,I) is given by (2) for x < I and by (3) for x = I. Given 
o(I), the principal selects T, F and p(,) so as to maximize the 
expected value of R(I,o(I)). This is a well-defined control problem, 
but it does not appear to be o very tractable one -- the solution to 
the general problem is not readily discernible. Consequently, we will 
consider two special (but interesting) coses; we will subsequently 
show that the second, despite its simplicity, is the least-cost policy 
of the form (p(,),T,F) which induces truthful reporting of income. 
3 , RANDOM AUDITS 
In this section we consider the optimal strategy for the 
principal when p(,) is independent of the level of reported income. 
As mentioned earlier, this is the random audit formulation used in all 
of the previous literature on this subject. 
Assumption 8. The audit probability function p(,) is independent of 
x. 
Denote the probability of an audit by p, Then from ( 2) and 
(3), if x(I, 
if x < T 
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rx(x,I) 
C" - p)
(4) 
if x 2. T 
and if x I, 
rx(x, I) o. (5) 
The implications of (4) and (5) are that if an agent under-reports his 
or her income, c/(I) 0 is optimal. Thus c/(I) is either 0 (given 
under-reporting) or I (given truthful reporting). Comparing these 
choices using (2) and (3) yields the following lemma,1 
Lemma 1, Under Assumptions 1-8, for any given p,T and F, the agent's 
optimal reporting rule is 
c/(I) 
{� 
0 
if p < T/(T + F)
if p 2. T/(T + F)
if p ( T/I
if p 2. T/I
for I 2. T + F 
for T � I ( T + F 
for I < T 
Proof, If I 2. T + F, r(O,I) = I - p(T + F) and r(I,I) 
c/(I) = 0 if and only if p < T/(T + F). 
I-T. Thus 
If T � I < T + F, r(O,I) (1-p)I and r(I,I) I-T. Thus 
cl( I) 0 if and only if p < T/I, 
Finally, if I ( T, r(O,I) (1-p)I and r(I,I) 0, Thus 
c/(I) = 0 for all I < T, Q,E,D, 
Remark 1. If p < T/(T + F) and I < T + F, then p ( T/I. Thus if 
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p < T/(T + F), then the agent will always report no income. llowever, 
·if p 2 T/(T + F), an agent with income less than T/p will evade (i. e.,
report income equal to zero) while those with incomes greater than or 
equal to T/p will report truthfully. 
Using Lemma 1 and Remark 1, we can write the principal's 
expected revenue as 
T+F co {-op + f pidG(I) + f p(T + F)dG(I) if p < TI (T + F)
ER(I, c/(I)) 
0 T + F 
T/p co 
- op + f pidG(I) + f TdG(I) if p 2 T/(T + F) 
0 T/p 
Notice that ER(,) is continuous at p = T/(T + F). We are concerned 
with maximizing (6) with respect to T,p and F, Cons
i
der T first,
Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, we have 
{p[l - G(T + F)]
E
�
(I,d(I)) = 
[1 - G(T/p)] 
if p < T
I 
(T + F)
if p 2. T/(T + F) 
(7) 
Using (7) we have immediately that if p ) O, then the optimal tax is
* 
T co, If p = 0, then T is irrelevant. 
Next consider the choice of p, Here 
(6) 
ER p 
When T 
T+F ., 
J IdG(I) + J (T + F)dG(I)
0 T+F 
{-c + 
T/p 
-c + J IdG(I)
0 
.,, equation (8) becomes 
ER p -c + 
( 
IdG(I) I 
0 
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if p < T/(T + F) 
(8) 
if p 2 T/(T + F) 
(9) 
• 
since T/(T + F) � 1 as T � °'• In this case, p ) 0 if and only if
• • 
(9) is positive, and then p = 1. Otherwise, p 0 and T is 
irrelevant. In either case F is irrelevant to the determination of 
the optimal (p
•
,T
•
) combination, so long as F is nonnegative. In 
particular, 
if p < TI (T + F)
T+F 
{( pdG(I) 
(10) 
• 
If p 
0 if p L T/(T + F) 
0, then F is clearly irrelevant. 
., and F is again irrelevant.2 
Thus we have the following theorem. 
• 
If p 1, then 
• 
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1-8, F is irrelevant. Either p = 0 and
• • 
T is also irrelevant or p °'· Moreover, p = 0 if and 
• 
only if average income is no greater than the audit cost c, and p 
if and only if average income exceeds the audit cost c. That is, 
and 
• 
p 
., 
0 if and only if J IdG(I) i c
0 
1 
4 • AUDIT CUTOFFS 
• 
p 1 if and only if J
°'
IdG(I) ) c.
0 
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In this section, we modify Assumption 8 in the following way • 
I 
Assumption 9. The audit probability function must take the form 
p(x) = g
where i e [O,.,), 
if x < i 
if x 2 i 
In other words, the principal always audits the agent if 
income less than i is reported. Otherwise an audit never takes place. 
This audit policy has the feature that an agent can "trigger" an audit 
by reporting income which is "too low." In this case, revenue to the 
principal (net of audit costs) from an agent with income I who reports 
income x is 
R(I,x) 
{ min{x,T} 
min{I,T} - c 
min(I,T + F} - c 
if i i x iI 
if i ) x =I 
if x < min ( i , I} 
(11) 
The logic behind (11) is as follows. If the agent reports an income 
greater than the cutoff, no audit takes place and either the reported 
income or the tax is paid, whichever is smaller. If the agent reports 
truthfully, but less than the cutoff, an audit takes place but no fine 
is imposed. Finally, if the agent reports less than the cutoff but 
lies, the tax plus the fine is imposed, whenever that is possible, 
Similarly, the agent's residual income is 
r(x,I) 
{ I - min(x,T) 
I - min(T, I) 
I - min (T + F, I) 
if iixil 
if i x =I 
if x min(i,I) 
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(12) 
Following as in Section 3, we have an analogous result to Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-7 and 9 ,  for any given i,T and F, 
t
l,0) if I < i 
if I 2. i for i < T 
d(I) 
{(I,O] if I < T 
(i, I) if l2.T for i 2. T 
Proof. The level of reported income only affects r(x,I) on the first 
branch of (12), and for that case rx i O. Hence d(I) =i on the first 
branch. On the second branch we set d(I) = I and on the third 
d(I) = O. Hence (12) implies 
I - min(i, T) for x l. i 
{� 
- T if I 2. T for i > x I 
max r(x, I) if I < T (13) 
x 
g- T - F if I 2. T + F for x ( min(i,I) 
if I T + F 
To determine optimal reports, we need only compare reports of i, I and 
O. It turns out that there are but two relevant cases. 
Case 1. i < T. 
When I i in this case, a report of i is inadmissible by 
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Assumption 7. A report of I implies r(I,I) = 0 as does a report of 0, 
r(O,I) = O. llence d(I) e ( 0,1). 
When ii I < T, r(i,I) = I-i, r(l,I) 0 and r(O, I) O. Thus 
d(I) i. 
For Ti I < T + F, r(i,I) 1-i, r(I,I) 1-T, and r(O,I) o. 
Hence again d(I) = i. 
Finally, when I 2. T + F, r(i,I) 1-i, r(I,I) = T and 
r(O,I) = 1-T-F. Hence d(I) = i. 
To summarize this case, when I < i, either 0 or I is reported, 
an audit occurs regardless, and the agent keeps nothing. If I 2. i, 
the agent always reports i, pays i, and is never audited. The fine F 
is i rrel ev ant. 
Case 2. i 2. T. 
If I < T, a report of i is inadmissible. Furthermore, 
r(I, I) = 0 r(O,I). Hence d(I) e ( 0,1). 
If Ti I < i, i is still inadmissible as a report. But 
r(I,I) = 1-T and r(O,I) = max(I-T-F,0). Hence d(I) =I. 
If I 2. i, then r(i,I) = 1-T, r(J,I) = 1-T, and 
r(O,I) = max(0,1-T-F). Bence d(I) e (i,1). 
Thus if i 2. T, the agent reports I or 0 when I < T and reports 
i or I when I 2. T (whenever i is admissible). Q.E.D. 
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Assuming the agent is truthful whenever he or she and the 
principal are otherwise indifferent (see footnote 1), Lemma 2 implies 
o( I) 
if I < i 
if I L i for i < T 
(14) 
for i 1 T 
It is interesting to note that under the audit cutoff rule, 
there may be universal truthful reporting; when there is some evasion, 
it is the relatively high income individuals who evade, This is in 
direct contrast to the results in the random audit case; in that case, 
there might be universal evasion; when there is some compliance, it is 
the relatively high income agents who comply. 
From (14), then, 
ml(I,<J(I)) = 
i {f0 (I-o)dG(I) 
T 
J (I-c)dG(I) 0 
CD 
+ s. idG(I) 1 
i CD 
+ J (T-c)dG(I) + s 
0
TdG(I) 
T 1 
if i < T 
if 1 T 
It is clear from (14) and (15) that F is irrelevant to both the 
optimal reporting rule of the agent and the optimal policy of the 
principal. Furthermore, 
{ -cg(i) + 1 - G(i) 
ER i(I,<J(I)) = 
-cg ( i) 
Now ER(I,d(I)) is continuous at 
if i < T 
if i > T 
T, It is decreasing in i for 
(15) 
(16) 
1 6  
i ) T, so clearly i � T ,  However, in this case only the cutoff i 
matters; T is irrelevant, Thus we can set i = T and use either branch 
• 
of (15) to solve for T , Substituting i = T and differentiating with 
respect to T implies 
( 17) 
This yields the basic result for audit cutoff policies , 
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1-7 and 9, F is irrelevant so long as it 
is nonnegative. Furthermore, i
• 
= T
• 
always, Beyond this, three 
cases are possible. 
(1) .
• • 
1 T 0
( 2) 
• • 
i T 
( 3) . 
. • ,... ,... 
1 = T T, where T solves 
,... ,... 
-cg(T) + 1 - G(T) o. 
The optimal tax/audit policy includes three �ossibilities: 
audit no one; audit everyone and take all their income; or audit those 
,... 
with reported income less than T and take all their money, while 
,... 
taking T from each agent who reports income greater than this amount, 
,... 
Remark 2. Note that for T to be a maximum, we must have 
,... ,... 
-cg'(T) + g(T) ( 0, (18) 
Denoting h(I) 
,... 
g(I)/ [1 - G(I)] as the hazard rate, T is defined by 
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h(�) = 1/c ond (18) is equivalent to h'(�) > O; i.e., the hozord rate 
A 
must be increasing at T, Actually, we can say more then this. 
Suppose h'(I) > 0 for all I. Then there is.!!!. most one interior 
critical p·oint and it is a local maximum of ER. If this value exists 
it must also provide a global maximum of ER. For otherwise there 
would exist an interior local minimum as well, which is impossible. 
A 
Thus if h'(I) > 0 for all I and there exists Te (0, 00) such that 
h(�) A 1/c, then T is optimal. 
Cases (1) and (2) of Theorem 2 correspond to the two 
possibilities under random audits either audit no one or audit 
everyone and take whatever income they have. The third possibility is 
the interesting one; it requires the principal to audit those with 
incomes less than some finite positive amount. Taxpayers with incomes 
below this level are always audited ond those with incomes above this 
level are never audited. Taxpayers with incomes above the cutoff are 
indifferent about reporting their true incomes or the cutoff level; 
the principal is also indifferent between these two reports, so one 
could observe some evasion among these higher income individuals. 
Notice that only truthful taxpayers are audited. Thus no fines are 
ever collected and audit costs are, in a sense, wasted. This 
highlights the nature of the audit es an incentive device; actual 
audit costs are the price for inducing those with higher incomes to 
report at least r
• 
Since the audit cutoff policy con generate the optimal random 
audit outcomes, but also admits an interior solution, it weakly 
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dominates the random audit policy. In addition to raising at least as 
much revenue as the random audit policy, the audit cutoff policy has 
several other desirable features. Stiglitz (197 6) and Weiss (197 6) 
hove suggested that randomness in the tax or audit rates may have 
beneficial incentive effects when labor supply decisions are 
endogenous and individuals are risk averse. When viewed from an ex 
ante perspective (i.e., before income is realized), the audit cutoff 
policy looks like a random audit policy with p = G(T
•
). Thus if labor 
supply decisions are made before the realization of (say) a random 
wage rate, then whatever benefits might be derived from using a random 
audit policy still apply when one uses an audit cutoff policy. 
There has also been much discussion of the desirability of 
horizontal equity in a tax system (e.g., Stiglitz (197 6) and Rosen 
(1978)). While a random audit policy is horizontally equitable in an 
ex ante sense (i.e., before anyone is audited, they face an identical 
probability of audit), it is not horizontally equitable ex post; that 
is, some individuals with the same income are audited, while others 
are not. The audit cutoff policy, however, is horizontally equitable 
both ex ante and ex post. That is, before income is determined, each 
individual faces a probability of G(T
•
) of being audited; after income 
is realized, all those with the same income make the same report and 
suffer the some consequences. Thus there is no question of treating 
identical people differently. 
S • INDUCIBILITY OF TRUTIIFUL REPORTING 
Definition. A given policy (p(.), T, F) induces truthful reporting if 
I e d(I) for that policy. That is, (p(.), T, F) induces truthful 
reporting if I is a best report for the agent. 
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Note that truthful reporting need not be the only best report. 
The audit cutoff policy of Section 4 
p(x) 
if x < T 
if x l T 
(19) 
induces truthful reporting, but agents with income greater than T also 
have d(I) = T as a best report. 
Lemma 3. A necessary and sufficient condition for a policy (p(.), T, F) 
to induce truthful reporting is that p(x) = 1 for all x < T. 
f!:Q..Qi. Using equations (2) and (3) , we see that for I< T, 
r(l, I) 2 r(x, I) for all x < I (note that Assumption 7 rules out x) I) 
if and only if 
0 2 (1 - p(x))(I - min{x, T)) 
for all x < I < T. This inequality holds if and only if p(x) = 1 for 
all x < T. 
For T � I ( T + F, r(I, I) 2 r(x, J) for ell x < I if and only 
if 
I - T 2 (1 - p(x))(I - min{x, T)). 
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Note that for x ( T, p(x) = 1, so this inequality is satisfied for all 
x ( T. For x LT, with x ( I ( T + F, min{x, T) = T, so the above 
inequality reduces to 
I - T 2 (1 - p(x))(I - T). 
This is satisfied for any nonnegative p(x). 
Finally, for I 2 T + F, r(I,I) 2 r(x, I) for all x ( I if and 
only if 
I - T 2 (1 - p(x))(I - min{x, T)) + p(x)(I - T - F). 
For x ( T, p(x) = 1 and I - T 2 I - T - F for all nonnegative F. For 
x LT, min{x, T) = T, so the inequality reduces to 
I - T 2 (1 - p(x))(I - T) + p(x)(I - T - F) 
which is true for all nonnegative p(x) and F. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3. The audit policy given in equation (19) is the least-cost 
policy of the form (p(.), T, F) which induces truthful reporting. 
Proof. By Lemma 3, the only restriction imposed on (p(.), T, F) by the 
requirement of truthful reporting is that p(x) = 1 for all x ( T, 
p(x) 2 0 for all x, and F L o. Any function p(x) for x 2 T will 
induce truthful reporting and p(x) = 0 does so at least audit cost to 
the principal. Q. E.D. 
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We have also examined audit policies which combine the aspects 
of random audits and audit cutoffs, They are called mixed policies 
and are of the form 
p(x) = 
{
pl 
P2 
if x i 
if x L i 
where 0 � p. � 1 for j = 1,2 and i e [0,oo). 
J 
Mixed policies allow for audit probabilities which may 
increase or decrease with reported income.3 Although the proof is too 
tedious to include here, it can be shown that the optimal mixed policy 
reduces to the optimal audit cutoff policy of Section 4 .  Thus there 
is reason to believe that the audit cutoff rule is actually the 
solution to the general control problem as well, The validity of this 
conjecture is now under investigation. 
Conlecture, The solution to the general control problem presented in 
Section 2 is the optimal audit cutoff rule of Theorem 2. 
Remark 3. It can be shown that, in any solution to the general 
control problem, p(x) = 0 for all x LT, To see this, note that for 
agents with incomes I L T (these are the only ones who can report 
x LT by Assumption 7) , truthful reporting dominates any report 
x e [T,I). That is, r(I,I) =I - T, while 
r(x,I) = (1 - p(x))(I - T) + p(x)(I - min[I,T+F}) for all x e [T,I). 
So long as p(x) L 0 ( > 0), it is at least as good (better) to report 
I as to report x e [T,I). Thus any report x LT will be truthful and 
it will not pay to audit agents reporting x L T with positive 
probability. Therefore p(x) = 0 for all x LT. All that remains to 
be proved is the optimality of p(x) = 1 for all x ( T. 4 
6 .  EXAMPLES AND COMPARATIVE STATICS 
Recall that for any given distribution of income G(.), the 
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audit cutoff rule weakly dominates the random audit policy. However, 
for some distributions, this dominance may be strict. In particular, 
• 
we know that this is true whenever a positive solution T exists for 
the equation 
1/c (20) 
and the hazard rate h(,) is strictly increasing. Thus the class of 
distributions with increasing hazard rate are of particular interest. 
Members of this class include the uniform distribution, truncated 
normal distributions, the Weibull distribution (with parameter a) 1), 
the gamma distribution (with parameter p) 1), and distributions with 
linear hazard rates.5 
Whenever equation (20) has an interior solution and the hazard 
• 
rate is increasing, differentiation implies that aT /ac ( 0, That is, 
• 
an increase in audit costs lowers the optimal tax T (and the audit 
cutoff i
•
), Consequently, fewer agents are audited and less revenue 
is collected: maximized expected revenue is 
ER = 
By the envelope theorem, 
• 
J
T 
(I-c)dG(I) + J
00 
T•dG(I), 
0 
T
• 
iJER/ac
• 
T - f dG(I) ( 0 
0 
so maximized expected revenue declines. 
We frequently think of taxing different classes of agents 
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differently. For instance, there may be other observable 
characteristics of individuals which are correlated with income (e.g., 
education or location of residence). Then we could think of G(.) as 
being parametrized by p, where p yields some information about the 
likelihood of a type-p agent having income level I. Denote this 
dependence by G(.;p). To determine the comparative static effects of 
p on T
• 
= T
•
(p), we would need to know the effect of a change in p 
upon h(.;p) = g(.;p)/[l - G(.;p)]. Since this seems beyond intuition, 
we now compute T
• 
for some examples and consider several parametric 
variations of interest. 
For the uniform distribution on [a,b], G(I) = I/M, where 
M = a-b. Solving for T
• 
yields T
• 
M - c, which is interior so long 
as M ) c. The mean of I is µ = (a+b)/2, while the variance is 
a2 (b-a)2/12. One might consider increasing the mean of the 
distribution, holding the variance constant. Since a2 � /12, we 
• • 
must hold M fixed. Consequenty, T = M - c implies that T is 
unaffected by a variance-preserving increase in the mean. On the 
other hand, a mean-preserving increase in the variance would increase 
M, while holding a+b constant. Thus (a+b)/2 • µ implies b = 2µ-a, or 
M = b-a = 2(µ-a). So an increase in M holding µ fixed is equivalent 
to a decrease in a. • Since T 2(µ-a) 
• 
- c, aT /a a < 0. Thus a 
decrease in a (corresponding to an increase in cr2) holding µ fixed, 
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results in an increase in T
•
. Agents facing uniform distributions 
with greater variance (and the same mean) should be required to pay 
higher taxes. 
Another interesting parameter change is related to stochastic 
dominance. We say that G( .;M1) dominates G( ,;Mz) if G(I;M1) < G(I;�'z) 
for all I; that is, income is stochastically greater under "':i than 
under M2• For the uniform distribution, G(.;Mi) dominates G(.;Mz) if 
• • • 
M1 > Mz. Since iJT /<JM > 0, T (M1) ) T 0!2) , Thus agents facing 
stochastically better uniform distributions of income should be taxed 
more (and should face a harsher audit cutoff policy). 
For distributions with linear hazard rate, 
G(I) = 1 - e-(al + 91
212>, for I e [O,�) and a, 9 ) O. Solving for T• 
• 
yields T (1 - ca)/ce, which is interior for 1 ) ca. Since 
iJG/iJa 
and 
ao/a0 
an increase in either a or 9 results in a stochastically dominated 
• 
distribution. Since aT /aa = -1/9 ( 0, and 
fJT
•/ae = -(1 - ca)/ce2 < 0, again we should raise the optimal 
tax/cutoff T• for distributions with stochastically higher income 
(i.e., those with lower values of a and/or 9). 
7 • PROPORTIONAL TAXATION WlTII RANDOM AUDITS 
In this section, we consider proportional, as opposed to 
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lump-sum taxation, in conjunction with a random audit policy. Let 
t e [ 0,1) be the constant average and marginal tax rate, assessed on 
all reported income, In addition, randomly selected individuals are 
subjected to an audit. If they are discovered to be under-reporting, 
a fine of F is assessed. 
Assumption 3'. Taxation is proportional; that is, the principal asks 
the agent to pay tI. 
Assumption 4 '. If an audit is performed and the agent has underpaid, 
he or she is assessed a fine of F dollars in addition to paying tI; 
i.e., he or she pays min{tI+F,IJ. No fine is ever paid if income is 
reported truthfully. 
Assumption 5'. The principal sets t,F and an audit probability 
function p(d), based on reported income d, so as to maximize expected 
revenue net of audit costs. 
Maintaining Assumption 8 (p(x) = p) implies that revenue to 
the principal from a taxpayer with income I who reports x is 
R(I, x) 
{min(J, tl+Fl - c 
td(1 - p) + 
tI 
if d ( I 
if d 2 I 
Residual income to the taxpayer with income I who reports 
income x is 
(21) 
r(x, I) 
{ (1-p) (I-td) + p(I-tI-F) 
(1-p) (I-td) 
(1-p)(I-td) + p(I-tI) 
if I 2 tI+F and d I 
if I < tI+F and d I 
if d 2 I 
2 6  
(22) 
Notice that all three branches of (22) are decreasing in d, so 
for the first two branches the optimal report is x = 0, while the 
optimal report in the last branch is x = I. Thus one need only 
compare the reports x = 0 and x = I. Subs ti tut ing these reports into 
(22) and comparing the payoff under truthful reporting to the payoff 
under a report of zero yields the following optimal reporting rule 
d(I). 
Lemma 4 .  Under Assumptions 1-2,3'-5', and 6-8, the optimal reporting 
rule for the taxpayer is 
f O if p < t 
lr if p 2 t for I < F/(1-t) 
<J(I) 
{� 
if I ) pF/t(1-p)( F/(1-t) 
if I .{ pF/t(l-p) for I 2 F/(1-t) 
Proof, For values of income I 2 tI+F (i.e., I 2 F/(1-t)), a taxpayer 
should evade (d = 0) if and only if (1-p)I + p(I-tI-F) ) I(1-t); that 
is, if and only if I )  pF/t(l-p).
For values of income I< tI+F (i.e., I< F/(1-t)), evasion is 
optimal if and only if (1-p)I ) (1-t)I; that is, if and only if 
p < t. Q.E.D. 
Notice that if p < t and I 2 F/(1-t), then I )  pF/t(l-p).
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Thus if p < t everyone evades, while if p L t, lower-income 
individuals are truthful while higher income individuals evade. This 
is the opposite of our finding for the lump-sum case, in which under a 
random audit policy it was the lower-income agents who evaded. 
Expected revenue to the tax authority can be computed using 
d(I). There are two relevant cases, but expected revenue is 
continuous across the point p 
= 
t. 
ER(I,d(I)) 
= 
O 
p(I-c)dG(I) + J
w 
p(It+F-c)dG(I) 
F/(1-t) if p < t 
w 
{r/(1-t) 
pF/t(l-p)
J (tI-po)dG(I) 
0 
+ J p(tI+F-o)dG(I) if p 2 t 
pF/t(l-p)
The principal maximizes this expression by a choice of t,p and F. 
First consider the choice of the tax rate t, 
ERt(l,d(I)) = 
{J
w 
pidG(I) 
F/(1-t)
pF/t(l-p) w 
J IdG(I) + J pidG(I) 
0 pF/t(l-p)
if p < t 
if p 2 t 
Since ER is increasing in t if p ) 0, t
* 
= 1 for p ) O. If p = 0, 
(24) 
then t is irrelevant. We may use either branch of (23) evaluated at 
• 
t 1 to solve for the optimal value of p. 
w 
ER J p(l-c)dG(I), p 
0 
Thus we have the following theorem. 
• 
However, given t = 1, 
(25) 
(23) 
Theorem 4 .  Under Assumptions 1-2,3'-5',and 6-8, the fine F is 
• • 
irrelevant. Either p = 0 and t is also irrelevant, or p = 1 and 
• 
t 
• 
1. Moreover, p = 0 if and only if mean income is no greater 
• 
than the cost per audit, while p = 1 if and only if mean income 
exceeds the cost per audit. That is, 
and 
• 
p 
• 
p 
0 if and only if J
w
idG(I) s c 
0 
1 if and only if J
w
idG(I) ) c. 
0 
Notice that these results are exactly the same as in the 
lump-sum formulation, That is, if mean income exceeds the cost per 
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audit, the optimal policy is to audit everyone and take all they have; 
if mean income is less than the cost per audit, the optimal policy is 
to audit no one, and collect no revenue, 
8, PROPORTIONAL TAXATION WITII AUDIT CUTOFF 
In tliis section, we consider proportional taution under the 
simple audit cutoff rule, Thus we invoke Assumptions 1-2,3'-5', 6-7 
and 9. Under this set of assumptions, revenue to the principal from a 
randomly selected taxpayer is 
{" 
for x L i 
R(l,x) ti - c for I s x < i (26) 
min{tI+F,I} - c for x < i and d < I 
29 
Residual income to an agent with income I who reports income x 
is 
r(x,I) 
I-tx 
I-tl 
{�-tl-F if I 2. F/0-t)
if I < F/(1-t) 
for x2.i 
for I � x ( i 
for x ( I and x ( i 
(27) 
Now there are three candidates for an optimal report; x = i, x 
= I an·d x = 0, for the three branches of (27), respectively. We need 
to compare these using (27) to determine the optimal report d(I). 
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1-2,3'-5',6-7 and 9, for any given i,t and 
F, 
Proof. There are two relevant cases. 
Case 1. i � F/(1-t). 
if I � i 
if I ) i 
For I � i, the report i is inadmissible by Assumption 7 
(again, the results are unchanged if over-reporting is allowed, but 
several additional sub-cases arise). A truthful report yields 
residual income r(I,I) = 1(1-t), while under-reporting yields r(O,I) 
O. To see this, note that I� i implies I� F/(1-t) or I < tl+F, so 
the audited evader can pay at most I (rather than tl+F). Thus for 
I ( i, d(I) = I. 
For i ( I, a report of i implies residual income r(i,I) = I-
ti, a truthful report implies income r(I,I) = I(l-t), and evasion 
implies 
{o
r(O,I) = 
I(l-t)-F 
if I � F/(1-t) 
if I 2. F/(1-t) 
Thus the optimal report for I ) i is d(I) = i. 
Case 2. i > F/(1-t). 
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Again there are several ranges of income to be considered, but 
so long as I � i, d(I) = I, and for I > i, d(I) 
= 
i. Q.E.D. 
Notice that evasion is practiced by those agents with 
relatively high incomes.6 This coincides with the results under a
random audit policy, in which evasion occurs in the ranks of the 
higher-income taxpayers. This is to be contrasted with the lump-sum 
results, in which the random audit policy resulted in evasion by the 
relatively low-income taxpayers, while under the audit cutoff policy 
relatively high-income taxpayers were indifferent between truthful 
reporting and evasion, 
Expected revenue to the tax authority, net of auditing costs, 
under the optimal reporting rule given above, is 
i 00 
ER(I,d(I)) = f (tI-c)dG(I) + f tidG(I).
0 i 
(28) 
The principal wishes to maximize this expression by a choice of i and 
t (F is clearly irrelevant). Differentiating with respect to t yields 
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i 
ERt(I, d(I)) = J IdG(I) + i(l - G(i)) 0 
(29) 
• 
which is strictly positive if i > O. Thus either i > 0 and t 
• 
i = 0 ,  in which case t is irrelevant. In any event, t = 1 is 
• 
1, or 
optimal. Evaluating (30) at t = 1 and differentiating with respect 
to i yields 
-cg(i) + 1 - G(i). ( 30) 
Theorem S .  Under Assumptions 1-2,3'-S',6-7 and 9, F is irrelevant so 
• 
long as it is nonnegative. Furthermore, t = 1. Beyond this, three 
cases are possible. 
(1) 
• 
i 
• 
i ( 2) 
(3) i 
• 
= 
0 
A 
i, where 
A 
i solves 
A A 
-cg(i) + 1 - G( i) 
A 
o. 
Notice that the value of i in Theorem S is the same as the 
A 
value of T in Theorem 2. Thus tl1e results of Theorem S are identical 
to those of Theorem 2. That is, the principal may audit no one 
(i
• 
= O); audit everyone and take all their income (i
• 
= 00); or audit 
A 
those with reported income below i and take all their income, while 
A A 
taking i from each agent who reports at least i. The same equivalence 
exists between Theorems 4 and 1 in the random audit case. Thus, 
despite the fact that there may be some differences in the best 
reporting rule for taxpayers, there is essentially complete 
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equivalence between the equilibrium consequences of lump-sum and 
proportional taxation . 
9. CONCLUSIONS, VARIATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This paper has established two major results and offered one 
conjecture in the context of a simple model of income tax compliance. 
First, random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules. 
It can be shown, given lump-sum taxes and fines, that these audit 
cutoff rules are the least-cost policies which induce truthful 
reporting of income. Second, the dominance of audit cutoff rules over 
random audit rules holds for "lump-sum" as well as proportional 
taxation -- in fact, the equilibrium consequences of the two are 
equivalent. In addition, we conjectured that an audit cutoff rule is, 
in fact, the solution to the general problem outlined in Section 2 .  
These results were established under fairly strong 
assumptions, however. In particular, we assumed risk-neutrality for 
all agents and that the principal desired to maximize net expected 
revenue. In spite of its simple nature, the model developed in this 
paper yielded interesting results not found in the previous 
literature, and several extensions seem worth pursuing. 
An important extension would be to consider risk averse 
agents. It is easy to show that the problem under the audit cutoff 
rule is unchanged; agents face no real uncertainty, and (as long as 
utility is increasing in income) they will behave precisely as 
described in Section 4. However, the risk averse agent will respond 
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differently to the random audit policy. This analysis leaves open the 
possibility that a policy of random audits may be more effective than 
an audit cutoff policy when taxpayers are risk averse. 7 
Obviously, it is important to consider alternative objective 
functions; for example, the tax authority may desire to minimize the 
cost of raising a specified amount of revenue. One might also 
consider the more traditional objective of maximizing a utilitarian 
criterion. 
There is a presumption in the tax policy literature that some 
taxpayers are always honest, even when they could increase their 
expected net income by under-reporting. To capture this formally, we 
could assume some fraction of taxpayers, say a, always report 
honestly. The issue is how this affects the principal's optimal 
strategy; in particular, what happens as a decreases? One might 
speculate that in the lump-sum case, the presence of an "honest" group 
will drive a wedge between i
• 
and T
• 
when audit cutoffs are used. 
Beyond this, however, it is not clear what might happen, 
Instead of knowing the function p(.), taxpayers might only 
know p = E [p(d)], particularly if they don't know the distribution of 
income, G(,). In this case, the issue is whether it is in the 
interest of the principal to reveal p(.) or whether net revenue can be 
increased by exploiting taxpayer ignorance of the audit rule. 
In a move toward realism, one might reformulate the model so 
that the principal sees true income I (via W-2 forms, for example) but 
the taxpayer can claim deductions, say o(I). The audit rule could 
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then be based on the ratio of deductions to income. 
Alternative formulations of the fine might be considered; for 
instance, the fine might be proportional to the unreported income 
(e.g. , Allingham and Snndmo (1972) and Srinivasan (197 3)) or to evaded 
taxes (e. g., Yitzhnki (1974)). 
Finally, ns a formal matter, it might be of interest to 
compare bonuses for truthful reporting to fines for under-reporting. 
Other variations are possible, but it is clear from the s uggestions 
above that much interesting work remains. 
• 
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1 .  Throughout this paper w e  will assume that whenever an agent is 
indifferent between two or more actions, he or she will take that 
action which is most preferred by the principal. This is a 
standard assumption in the principal-agent literature. 
2. Having noted that one can "trade off" penalties for probability of 
detection in attempting to increase compliance, several authors 
have remarked that if it is costly to detect and convict 
offenders, but there is no cost to imposing a penalty, then the 
"optimal" solution is a very small probability of detection and a 
very large penalty (e. g. , Becker (1968), Stern (197 8), Kemp and Ng 
(1979), Polinsky and Shavell (1979) and Kolm (197 3)). These 
studies have typically taken the tax as exogenous, or have focused 
on crime and punishment, in which there is no analog to the tax, 
and have taken as objective the maximization of a social welfare 
function. 
3. Of the three policies examined in this paper, the mixed audit 
policy most closely approximates the "true" audit policy. "As a 
part of its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, the IRS 
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periodically conducts random audits of the tax-paying population. 
From information obtained there on characteristics of tax evaders 
and other underreporters, they devise formulas designed to 
identify likely candidates for audits. , .  About all that is known 
generally is that individual tax returns are separated into audit 
classes -- based on income and type of income -- for analysis, and 
occasionally the average probabilities for each class have been 
made public. Still, the probability for any tax return in a given 
class is a function of its reported items (Clotfelter (1982)) . "  
Thus while individuals do face the possibility of being audited in 
a purely random fashion, they also face a "formula," and 
consequently may "trigger" an audit through their reporting 
behavior. 
4 .  In papers on the general principal-agent problem, there is 
frequent reference to the Revelation Principle. In our context, 
this would say: given any tax/audit/fine policy in some feasible 
set, there exists another feasible policy which induces truthful 
reporting and leaves both principal and agent at least as well off 
as the originial policy. Thus without loss of generality, one can 
restrict attention to policies which induce truthful reporting. 
The key to using this principle is defining an appropriate 
feasible set; not just any set will do , In particular, we have 
been unable to prove that the Revelation Principle applies within 
our restricted domain of policies of the form (p(.),T,F). (Note 
that if we could show this, we would be done, because of Lemma 3 
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and Theorem 3). The revelation principal does apply in the 
slightly larger set of policies of the form (p(x),�(x),f(x)), 
where the audit policy is p(x), the tax policy is min(�(x),T} and 
the fine policy is 
{ min{I,T} 
min{I,T + F} 
if f(x) I 
if f(x) ( I 
If the agent optimally reports d(I) in response to this policy, 
then the policy (p(x),;(x),f(x)) = (p(d(x)),�(o(x)),f(o(x))) gives 
both the principal and the agent the same payoffs and induces 
truthful reporting. However, now one needs to characterize three 
functions rather than one. We have made little headway on this 
problem. 
5 .  The Weibull (with a =  1) and the gamma (with p = 1) coincide with 
the exponential distribution, which has constant hazard rate. 
Common distributions with decreasing hazard rates are the 
lognormal distribution, the Weibull (with a< 1), the gamma (with 
P < 1) and the Pareto distribution. 
6. It is interesting to note that, if income can be arbitrarily 
large, then no policy of the form (p(.),t,F) can induce truthful 
reporting with proportional taxation unless p(x) = 1 for all x. 
To see this, note that residual income with proportional taxation 
is 
r( XI I) (1 - p(x))(I - tx) + p(x)(I - min(tl + F,I} 
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for x ( I, and 
r(I,) I(l - t). 
For tl + F �I (i.e., I 2 F/(1-t)), truthful reporting is optimal 
if and only if 
I(l - t) 2 (1 - p(x))(I - tx) + p(x)(I - tl - F) 
for all x ( I  and all I 2 F/(1 - t). Simplifying implies 
(1 - p(x))t(I - x) � p(x)F 
for all x ( I  and for all I 2 F/(1-t). But since I can be
arbitrarily large, this requires p(x) = 1 for all x. If p(x) ,. 1 
for all x, then those with incomes I < F/(1-t) will also tell the 
truth, so there is truthful reporting by all agents. 
7 .  Jn some ways, our problem of choosing an optimal audit policy is 
similar to Townsend's (1979) problem of optimal contracts with 
costly state verification. In that model, agent l's endowment is 
certain, while agent 2's endowment is random. Motivated by risk-
sharing considerations, they agree to a contract to transfer 
endowment from one to the other for certain realizations of the 
random endowment, which is observed only by agent 2. The decision 
to ask for verification and the responsibility for the attendant 
costs lies with agent 2, the informed agent, Townsend examines 
deterministic verification schemes, but concludes from an example 
that these can be dominated by a stochastic verification scheme. 
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By contrast, in our problem the audit policy is imposed on the 
agent by the principal; there is no mutuality of interest. The 
agent reports an income realization, and the principal is 
responsible for the decision to audit and the accompanying costs. 
40 
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